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Abstract
In the modeling of competition on networks it is usually assumed
that users either behave following the Wardrop equilibrium or the
Nash equilibrium concept. Nevertheless, in several equilibrium situ-
ations, for instance in urban traffic flows, intercity freight flows and
telecommunication networks, a mixed behavior is observed. This pa-
per presents a time-dependent network model shared by two types of
users: group users (Nash players) and individual users (Wardrop play-
ers). A group user has a significant impact on the load of the network,
whereas an individual user has a negligible impact. Both classes of
users choose the paths to ship their jobs so as to minimize their costs,
but they apply different optimization criteria. The source of interac-
tion of users is represented by the travel demand, which is assumed
to be elastic with respect to the equilibrium solution. Thus, the equi-
librium distribution is proved to be equivalent to the solution of an
appropriate time-dependent quasi-variational inequality problem. A
result on the existence of solutions is discussed as well as a numerical
example.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, Wardrop equilibrium, routing, quasi-
variational inequality
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1 Introduction
In the modeling of competition on networks it is usually assumed that users
either behave following the Wardrop equilibrium or the Nash equilibrium
concept. Nevertheless, in several equilibrium situations a mixed behavior
is observed. We mention, for instance, the case of intercity freight flows,
in which one recognizes the presence of shippers who have different mar-
ket power. Thus, the mixed equilibrium appears as the most natural and
appropriate equilibrium concept, which is able to represent a situation in
which larger shippers aim at minimizing their own costs, acting via the
system equilibrium concept, whereas smaller shippers are user-equilibrium
oriented. An analogous situation may occur in telecommunication networks,
where different competitive forces act in the market.
This paper presents time-dependent multiclass routing games which oc-
cur in telecommunication networks (see [1, 4, 9, 20] for some relevant results
on this topic). We assume that the network model is shared by two types of
users: group users (Nash players or player with market power) and individ-
ual users (Wardrop players or price-takers). A group user has a significant
impact on the load of the network, whereas an individual user has a negli-
gible impact. Both classes of users choose the routes to ship their jobs so as
to minimize their costs, but they follow their own optimization criteria.
Our aim is to characterize time-dependent equilibria in this mixed situa-
tion and provide an opportune variational formulation. As we are interested
in analyzing and describing time-dependent phenomena, we allow all data
to be time-specific. Moreover, we assume that the amount of jobs spread
through the network is bounded and users incur in equilibrium-dependent
travel demands. Thus, the time-dependent mixed equilibrium model is de-
scribed by an infinite-dimensional quasi-variational inequality problem of
the form:
Find x∗ ∈ K(x∗) :
∫ T
0
〈F (t, x∗(t)), x(t) − x∗(t)〉dt ≥ 0, ∀x(t) ∈ K(x∗),
where F : [0, T ] × Rn+w → Rn+w, K : E → 2L
2(0,T ;Rn+w), E is a nonempty,
convex, bounded and closed subset of L2(0, T ;Rn+w) and n,w ∈ N will be
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specified in the following. We are concerned with providing conditions for
the existence of solutions to such a problem. We address the interested
reader to the monograph [2] and references therein for a survey of theory
and applications of quasi-variational inequalities.
Research presented in this paper advances the modeling of routing games
in the following ways:
1. We extend the mixed behavior traffic network equilibrium model (see
[9] and the recent work [4]) as we take into consideration the evolu-
tion of the system with respect to time. Thus, we do not refer to an
instantaneous network situation, but we focus on the actual network
situation and take into account all the travel times experienced by
users during the time interval of interest. In addition, we take into
consideration capacity constraints on the multiflows spread through
the network, thus improving the unconstrained models known in the
literature.
2. The source of interaction of users is represented by travel demands
which are assumed to be elastic with respect to the equilibrium solu-
tion. This allows us to capture all the equilibria adjustment processes.
As a consequence, the problem is expressed as an infinite-dimensional
quasi-variational inequality problem.
3. As already realized in [9], unlike the standard market oligopoly model,
the mixed behavior equilibrium model contains some externalities so
that some paradoxical results may be observed. This outcome de-
serves more attention and may unveil new features of network-based
competition models.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a detailed description of
the network system is given and the mixed equilibrium concept is presented.
In Section 3 a complete characterization of mixed equilibria in terms of an
opportune quasi-variational inequality is given. In Section 4 we provide an
existence result, followed, in Section 5, by a numerical example. Section 6
summarizes our findings and presents some further research issues.
2 Mixed network equilibrium
In the time interval [0, T ] we consider a general network G(M,L), where
M is the set of nodes and L is the set of directed links through the nodes.
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As we are interested in a time-dependent setting, our functional space is the
Hilbert space L2(0, T ;Rq) (with T > 0) of square-integrable functions from
the closed interval [0, T ] to Rq (q will be specified in the following), endowed
with the scalar product 〈·, ·〉L2 =
∫ T
0 〈·, ·〉dt and the usual associated norm
‖ · ‖L2 . As usual the scalar product in R
q is denoted by 〈·, ·〉 and the norm
by ‖ ·‖. We present a path-based model, however, sometimes (see numerical
example in Section 5), the link-based model will be considered. Therefore,
we introduce two notations, one in terms of paths and the other in terms of
links (see model description in [4]).
We focus on a network shared by two types of users: group users and
individual users. We denote by N the set of group users, with |N | = N (|A|
denotes the number of elements of the set A) and by W, |W| = W , the set
of classes of individual users. We denote by I = N ∪W the set of all users
in the network and assume that I is finite. It results |I| = I = N +W .
Each user i ∈ I has to ship some jobs from a source s to a destination
d with a service rate at time t denoted by µi(t). We set µi(t) = (µia(t), a =
1, . . . , L), where L = |L|. The service rate µia(t) may be regarded as the
speed at which the job routed by class i is processed at link a at time t. We
also assume that µia(t) > 0, for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], ∀a ∈ L. For each user i we
denote by δi(s,d)(t) the travel demand for the jobs leaving the source of the
origin-destination pair (s, d) at time t.
Individual users are grouped into classes and also a group user is called a
class, see reference [4]. In addition, there are numerous classes of jobs, each
of which represents a large number of jobs. In the context of road traffic, for
instance, an individual user may correspond to a single driver, and the class
may correspond to all the drivers of a given type of vehicle that have a given
source and destination; a group user may be a transportation company.
A group user has a significant impact on the load of the network and,
as a consequence, on delays in which any other user may incur. This type
of user follows a class-centralized optimization approach, in the sense that
routing decisions are taken by a single decision maker and, hence, the ap-
propriate equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium. Clearly, when all
origin-destination pairs are controlled by a single decision maker, the model
results in the well-known system equilibrium. If this extreme case is not ver-
ified, each class of group users exhibits a system equilibrium-like behavior,
but the system is not in a system equilibrium.
Each user i ∈ N is characterized by:
• one service rate µi(t) = (µia(t))a∈L;
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• a set of origin-destination pairs Di;
• a travel demand vector δi(t) = (δi(s,d)(t))(s,d)∈Di .
Individual users, whose routing decisions have a negligible impact on the
load of the network, have a single job to route from a given source to a given
destination with a given service rate.
Each user i ∈ W is characterized by:
• one service rate µi(t) = (µia(t))a∈L;
• one origin-destination pair (s, d);
• one travel demand δi(s,d)(t).
We remark that all the jobs of class i have the same service rate.
We now introduce some other network customary concepts. We denote
by p a sequence of directed links from a source to a destination. For i ∈ I we
denote by Pi the set of paths used by class i, by Pi(s,d) the set of paths used
by class i from source s to destination d. We also have Pi = ∪(s,d)∈DiP
i
(s,d)
and P = ∪i∈IP
i. Let n =
∑
i∈N |P
i| be the number of paths used by Nash
players, w =
∑
i∈W |P
i| the number of paths used by Wardrop players and
let n+ w =
∑
i∈I |P
i| be the total number of paths in the network.
For i ∈ I and a ∈ L, let f ia(t) the amount of jobs sent by class i and cir-
culating on link a at time t. For i ∈ I we group f ia(t) into the vector f
i(t) =
(f i1(t), . . . , f
i
L(t))
T . Then, we denote by fa(t) =
∑
i∈N f
i
a(t) +
∑
i∈W f
i
a(t)
the total flow on link a. Finally, we set f(t) = (f1(t), . . . , fL(t))
T , which
represents the link strategy vector.
Analogously, for i ∈ I and p ∈ Pi, let xip(t) the amount of jobs sent
by class i and circulating on path p at time t. We remark that if i ∈ N ,
xip(t) is the amount of jobs of user i sent through path p, whereas , if
i ∈ W, xip(t) represents the amount of individual users of class i that choose
path p to ship their unique job. We group the amounts of jobs xip(t) into
the vector xi(t) = (xi1(t), . . . , x
i
|Pi|(t))
T and further into the vector x(t) =
(x1(t), . . . , xI(t))T , which represents the path strategy vector. We may
also write x(t) = (xN (t), xW(t))T , where xN (t) = (x1(t), . . . , xN (t))T and
xW(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xW (t))T . Moreover, we may set x(t) = (xip(t))i∈I,p∈Pi ,
namely x(t) may be regarded as the n+w-dimensional multiflow generated
on paths by all the users of the network.
We denote by Γ is the link-path incidence matrix, whose typical entry
γap is 1 if link a is contained in path p and 0 otherwise. It then results
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that f ia(t) =
∑
p∈Pi γapx
i
p(t), ∀i ∈ I. Finally, ∀a ∈ L and ∀i ∈ I, we
introduce the link cost functions cia(f(t)). We group c
i
a(f(t)) into the vec-
tor ci(f(t)) = (ci1(f(t)), . . . , c
i
L(f(t)))
T and further into the vector c(t) =
(c1(f(t)), . . . , cI(f(t)))T , which represents the link strategy vector.
In the following, we assume that user i ∈ I incurs in elastic travel
demands which depend on the equilibrium distribution x∗(t). Let mN =∑
i∈N |D
i| the number of O/D pairs controlled by Nash users and m =
mN + 1 =
∑
i∈I |D
i| the total number of O/D pairs in the network. Thus,
we may introduce the travel demand function δ(t, x) : [0, T ] × Rn+w → Rm
such that
a) δ(t, x) is measurable in t ∀x ∈ Rn+w, continuous in x for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],
and
∃γ1 ∈ L
2(0, T ), η1(t) ∈ L
∞(0, T ) : ‖δ(t, x)‖ ≤ γ1(t) + η1(t)‖x‖.
Now, let E be a nonempty, convex, bounded and closed subset of L2(0, T ;Rn+w)
and let K be the multifunction K : E → 2L
2(0,T ;Rn+w) defined as
K(x∗) =
{
x(t) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn+w) : ∀i ∈ I,∀(s, d) ∈ Di,∀p ∈ Pi(s,d),
0 ≤ xip(t) ≤ x
i
p(t),
∑
p∈Pi
(s,d)
xip(t) = δ
i
(s,d)(t, x
∗(t)) a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]
}
,
where xip(t), i ∈ I, p ∈ P
i is the upper bound on the amount of job sent
through path p by user i at time t.
Remark 1 It results that K(x∗) = KN (x∗)×KW(x∗), where
KN (x∗) =
{
xN (t) ∈ L2(0, T ;RN ) : ∀i ∈ N ,∀(s, d) ∈ Di,∀p ∈ Pi(s,d),
0 ≤ xip(t) ≤ x
i
p(t),
∑
p∈Pi
(s,d)
xip(t) = δ
i
(s,d)(t, x
∗(t)) a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]
}
,
and
KW(x∗) =
{
xW(t) ∈ L2(0, T ;RW ) : ∀i ∈ W,∀p ∈ Pi(s,d), 0 ≤ x
i
p(t) ≤ x
i
p(t),
∑
p∈Pi
(s,d)
xip(t) = δ
i
(s,d)(t, x
∗(t)) a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]
}
.
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We now introduce the cost functions for the classes of users. We denote
by
J i(t, x) : [0, T ]× Rn+w → R+
the cost function of class i ∈ N , and by
Cip(t, x) : [0, T ] ×R
n+w → R+
the cost function on path p for each user of class i ∈ W.
In order to present a compact formulation, we introduce the notations
(J(t, x))T = (J i(t, x))i∈N ∈ R
N ,
C(t, x) = (Cip(t, x))i∈W ,p∈Pi ∈ R
w.
The following assumptions will be required:
b) J(t, x) is measurable in t ∀x ∈ Rn+w, convex and continuously differ-
entiable with respect to x for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], and
∃γ2 ∈ L
1(0, T ), η2(t) ∈ L
∞(0, T ) : ‖J(t, x)‖ ≤ γ2(t) + η2(t)‖x‖
2;
c) C(t, x) is measurable in t ∀x ∈ Rn+w, continuous in x for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],
and
∃γ3 ∈ L
2(0, T ), η3(t) ∈ L
∞(0, T ) : ‖C(t, x)‖ ≤ γ3(t) + η3(t)‖x‖.
For every i ∈ N let Ψip(t, x) be the derivative of J
i(t, x) with respect to xip.
Then it result Ψ(t, x) = (Ψip(t, x))i∈N ,p∈Pi ∈ R
n. We suppose that
d) Ψ(t, x) is measurable in t ∀x ∈ Rn+w, continuous in x for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],
and
∃γ4 ∈ L
2(0, T ), η4(t) ∈ L
∞(0, T ) : ‖Ψ(t, x)‖ ≤ γ4(t) + η4(t)‖x‖.
Users aim at minimizing their costs according to different criteria. The
optimization problem of user i ∈ N is the following minimization problem
in which all other players’s strategies are assumed as fixed:
i ∈ N , min
xi(t) s.t.
(x∗−i(t), xi(t)) ∈ K(x∗)
∫ T
0
J i(t, x∗−i(t), xi(t))dt. (1)
The functional J i(t, x(t)) is convex in x and, by assumption b), it belongs
to L1(0, T ) and is continuous therein. Moreover, K(x∗), as will be proved
in Theorem 4.2, is a convex, bounded and closed subset of the Hilbert space
L2(0, T ;Rn+w) and therefore it is also weakly compact (see Theorem B.4 in
[10]). By Lemma 2.11 and Theorem 2.3 in [10], a solution to (1) does exist.
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Remark 2 If K(x∗) =
∏
i∈I K
i(x∗), where for all i ∈ I
Ki(x∗) =
{
xi(t) ∈ L2(0, T ;R|P
i|) : ∀(s, d) ∈ Di,∀p ∈ Pi(s,d),
0 ≤ xip(t) ≤ x
i
p(t),
∑
p∈Pi
(s,d)
xip(t) = δ
i
(s,d)(t, x
∗(t)) a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]
}
,
then minimization problem (1) becomes
i ∈ N , min
xi(t)∈Ki(x∗(t))
∫ T
0
J i(t, x∗−i(t), xi(t))dt. (2)
User i ∈ W, who takes costs as given, fulfills a Wardrop-type principle.
However, due to the presence of capacity constraints, we can not refer to the
usual Wardrop principle (see [19]), hence we have recourse to a generalized
form (see [14]), which is able to represent the constrained network model.
We are now ready to provide the mixed equilibrium definition.
Definition 1 x∗(t) ∈ K(x∗) is a mixed equilibrium if, for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],
the subsequent conditions hold
∀i ∈ N , ∀(s, d) ∈ Di, ∀p ∈ Pi(s,d)
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t)


≥ 0 if x∗ip (t) = 0
= 0 if 0 < x∗ip (t) < x
i
p(t)
≤ 0 if x∗ip (t) = x
i
p(t);
(3)
(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t))− βi(t)
)
(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t)) = 0; (4)
∀i ∈ W, ∀p, q ∈ Pi(s,d),
Cip(t, x
∗(t)) < Ciq(t, x
∗(t))⇒ x∗ip (t) = x
∗i
p (t) or x
∗i
q (t) = 0, (5)
where αip(t) ∈ L
2(0, T ) and βi(t) = βi(s,d)(t) ∈ L
2(0, T ) are the Lagrange
functions associated with bound constraints and demand requirements, re-
spectively. They are not known a priori, however, as will be seen in Theorem
3.1 and Theorem 3.2, conditions (3), (4) and (5) lead to a quasi-variational
inequality in which no such functions appear.
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3 The quasi-variational inequality formulation
In this section, we give a complete characterization of the mixed equilibrium
as a solution to a suitable quasi-variational inequality. We start with proving
some preliminary results.
Theorem 1 x∗i(t), i ∈ N , is a solution to (1) if and only if it solves the
problem ∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
Ψip(t, x
∗(t))(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt ≥ 0, (6)
∀xi(t) : (x1(t), . . . , xi(t), . . . , xN (t)) ∈ KN (x∗).
Proof. The proof uses standard arguments of variational inequality
theory and network equilibrium problems (see [6, 7, 8, 17]) and therefore
will be omitted. 
Theorem 2 x∗i(t), i ∈ N , is a solution to (1) or (6) if and only if it
satisfies conditions (3) and (4).
Proof. The proof is performed applying arguments of Lagrangian theory.
For i ∈ N let us consider the function
L(xi(t), αi(t), βi(t)) =
∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
Ψip(t, x
∗(t))(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt
−
∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
αip(t)(x
i
p(t)− x
i
p(t))dt
−
∫ T
0
βi(t)
( ∑
p∈Pi
(s,d)
xip(t)− δ
i
(s,d)(t, x
∗(t))
)
dt,
where x(t) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn+w) and
(αi(t), βi(t)) ∈ C,
C =
{
αi(t) ∈ L2(0, T ;R|P
i|), αip(t) ≥ 0, p ∈ P
i;
βi(t) ∈ L2(0, T ), i = 1, . . . , N
}
.
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By applying arguments of Lagrangian theory (see [5, 10]), it is possible to
prove that there exist αip(t) ≥ 0, p ∈ P
i and
∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
αip(t)(x
i
p(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt = 0⇒ α
i
p(t)(x
i
p(t)− x
∗i
p (t)) = 0 (7)
p ∈ Pi, a.e. in [0, T ].
Moreover, characterizing solutions as saddle points we may write
L(xi(t), αi(t), βi(t))
=
∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t)
)
(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt ≥ 0,
∀x(t) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn+w). Let us suppose that xiq(t) = x
∗i
q (t), ∀q 6= p, hence
we get ∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t)
)
(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt
=
∫ T
0
(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t)
)
(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt ≥ 0. (8)
In order to prove condition (3), we consider the following cases:
1. If x∗ip (t) = 0 for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], we show that
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t) ≥ 0.
We argue by contradiction and suppose that there exists a set of posi-
tive measure Ω ⊂ [0, T ] so that Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) +αip(t)− β
i(t) < 0 for a.e.
t ∈ Ω. Let us choose xip(t) as follows
xip(t)
{
> 0 if t ∈ Ω
= x∗ip (t) if t ∈ [0, T ] \ Ω,
then expression (8) results in∫ T
0
(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t)
)
(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt
=
∫
Ω
(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t)
)
xip(t)dt < 0.
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2. If x∗ip (t) = x
i
p(t) for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], we prove that
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t) ≤ 0.
We argue by contradiction and consider a set of positive measure Ω ⊂
[0, T ] so that Ψip(t, x
∗(t))+αip(t)−β
i(t) > 0 for a.e. t ∈ Ω. By choosing
xip(t) as follows
xip(t)
{
< xip(t) if t ∈ Ω
= x∗ip (t) if t ∈ [0, T ] \ Ω,
it results that∫ T
0
(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t)
)
(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt
=
∫
Ω
(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t)
)
(xip(t)− x
i
p(t))dt < 0.
3. Finally, if we suppose that 0 < x∗ip (t) < x
i
p(t) for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], by
using the same technique as in the previous cases, it can be easily
proved that Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t) − β
i(t) can not be either positive or
negative on any set of positive measure.
In order to prove condition (4) we proceed as follows. If x∗ip (t) = x
i
p(t)
a.e in [0, T ] or 0 < x∗ip (t) < x
i
p(t) a.e in [0, T ], condition (4) immediately
follows from (3). We now suppose that x∗ip (t) = 0 a.e in [0, T ]. We set
λ(t) = Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t),
and choosing
xip(t) = λ(t),
inequality (8) becomes∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t)
)2
dt ≥ 0.
Now, by choosing
xip(t) = −λ(t),
we get
−
∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t)
)2
dt ≥ 0.
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Therefore,
Ψip(t, x
∗(t))− βi(t) = −αip(t).
Now, by (7) we obtain(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t))− βi(t)
)
(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t)) = 0.
Conversely, let (3) and (4) be true and prove that (6) is verified. From
(3) it follows that
∑
p∈Pi
(
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) − βi(t)
)
(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t)) ≥ 0. (9)
In fact, if x∗ip (t) = 0 for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], according to (3), it follows that
Ψip(t, x
∗(t)) + αip(t)− β
i(t) ≥ 0 and xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t) ≥ 0, hence (9) is verified.
If 0 < x∗ip (t) < x
i
p(t) for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], by (3) it results that Ψ
i
p(t, x
∗(t)) +
αip(t) − β
i(t) = 0. Finally, if x∗ip (t) = x
i
p(t) for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], Ψ
i
p(t, x
∗(t)) +
αip(t)− β
i(t) ≤ 0 and xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t) ≤ 0, hence (9) is proved.
Since
∑
p∈Pi
(s,d)
xip(t) = δ
i
(s,d)(t, x
∗(t)) a.e. in [0, T ], we obtain
∑
p∈Pi
Ψip(t, x
∗(t))(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t)) ≥ 0,
and integrating we get∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
Ψip(t, x
∗(t))(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt ≥ 0.
Therefore, the proof is complete. 
Remark 3 We observe that a combination of the above equilibrium behav-
iors, namely x∗ip (t) = 0, 0 < x
∗i
p (t) < x
i
p(t) and x
∗i
p (t) = x
i
p(t) a.e in [0, T ],
can be performed to the end of examining a more general situation and de-
scribing all the fluctuating values of solutions during the time horizon.
Theorem 3 x∗i(t), i ∈ W, satisfies (5) if and only if it solves
∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
Cip(t, x
∗(t))(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt ≥ 0, (10)
∀xi(t) : (x1(t), . . . , xi(t), . . . , xW (t)) ∈ KW(x∗).
11
Proof. The proof is on the lines of Theorem 2.1 in [16] and therefore
will be omitted. 
In order to express our equivalence result in a compact form, we intro-
duce the vector (F (t, x(t)))T = (Ψ(t, x(t)), C(t, x(t))) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn+w).
Theorem 4 x∗(t) ∈ K(x∗) is a mixed equilibrium if and only if it solves
the following quasi-variational inequality∫ T
0
〈F (t, x∗(t)), x(t) − x∗(t)〉dt (11)
=
∑
i∈N
∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
Ψip(t, x
∗(t))(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt
+
∑
i∈W
∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
Cip(t, x
∗(t))(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt ≥ 0,
∀x(t) ∈ K(x∗).
Proof. From the preceding theorems it follows that if x∗(t) = (xN (t), xW (t))T ∈
K(x∗) is a mixed equilibrium, then xN (t) = (x1(t), . . . , xi(t), . . . , xN (t))T
satisfies ∑
i∈N
∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
Ψip(t, x
∗(t))(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt ≥ 0,
and xW(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xi(t), . . . , xW (t))T verifies
∑
i∈W
∫ T
0
∑
p∈Pi
Cip(t, x
∗(t))(xip(t)− x
∗i
p (t))dt ≥ 0.
Therefore, x∗(t) solves (11) and the converse is also true. 
4 An existence result
Before showing our result, for reader’s convenience, we recall the following
theorem (see [18]) adapted to our case.
Theorem 5 Let X be a topological linear locally convex Hausdorff space and
let E ⊂ X be a convex, compact and nonempty subset. Let F : E → X ′ be a
continuous function and let K : E → 2E be a closed lower semicontinuous
multifunction with K(x), x ∈ E convex, compact and nonempty. Then, there
exists x∗ ∈ K(x∗)
〈F (x∗), x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K(x∗).
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Now we are able to prove the following result (see also [15, 16]).
Theorem 6 Let us assume that a), c), d) and the following assumptions
hold
e) ∃ν ∈ L2(0, T ), ν(t) ≥ 0 for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]:
‖δ(t, x1)− δ(t, x2)‖ ≤ ν(t)‖x1 − x2‖, ∀x1, x2 ∈ R
n+w;
f) Ψ(t, x), C(t, x) and δ(t, x) are convex in x for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ] and
upper semicontinuous with respect to the weak topology in x ∈ E for
a.e. t ∈ [0, T ].
Then quasi-variational inequality problem (11) admits a solution.
Proof. The proof has recourse to weak topology arguments. First we
observe that under hypotheses a), c), d) and if x∗(t) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn+w), it
results that
F (t, x∗(t)) = (Ψ(t, x∗(t)), C(t, x∗(t)))T ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn+w),
δ(t, x∗(t)) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rm).
Moreover, by a), c) and d) it follows that F and δ belong to the class of
Nemytskii operators, therefore if x∗k(t) −→L
2
x(t) then
‖F (t, x∗k(t))− F (t, x∗(t))‖L2 → 0, ‖δ(t, x
∗k(t))− δ(t, x∗(t))‖L2 → 0,
and the functions F and δ are L2-continuous with respect to the strong
topology.
Now, in order to prove that K(x∗) is a weakly closed multifunction,
we show that it is strongly closed, i.e. for any sequences {x∗k(t)} and
{xk(t)} in L2(0, T ) such that x∗k(t) −→L
2
x∗(t) and xk(t) −→L
2
x(t), with
xk(t) ∈ K(x∗k(t)) ∀k ∈ N, it results that x(t) ∈ K(x∗).
Let {x∗k(t)}, {xk(t)} two arbitrary convergent sequences in L2(0, T ).
Since xk(t) ∈ K(x∗k(t)), we have that 0 ≤ xikp (t) ≤ x
i
p(t), for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],
∀i ∈ I, ∀p ∈ Pi and, by the convergence of the sequence {xk(t)} in L2,
the bound constraints on x(t) are satisfied. Moreover, ∀i ∈ I, ∀(s, d) ∈ Di,
∀p ∈ Pi(s,d), it holds ∑
p∈P i
(s,d)
xikp (t) = δ
i
(s,d)(t, x
∗k(t)).
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The left-hand side converges almost everywhere to
∑
p∈P i
(s,d)
xip(t). By ap-
plying e) it follows that
|δi(s,d)(t, x
∗k(t))− δi(s,d)(t, x
∗(t))| −→ 0,
and thus we conclude that x(t) ∈ K(x∗). Therefore, since K(x∗(t)) is convex
and strongly closed, we conclude that it is weakly closed.
In order to prove that K(x∗) is a weakly lower semi-continuous set-
valued map, we show that ∀{x∗k(t)} weakly converging to x∗(t) in L2 (briefly
x∗k(t)⇀ x∗(t)), ∀x(t) ∈ K(x∗) there exists {xk(t)} so that
xk(t)⇀ x(t) with xk(t) ∈ K(x∗k(t)) ∀k ∈ N.
Let us consider an arbitrary sequence x∗k(t)⇀ x∗(t), x(t) ∈ K(x∗) and
fix k ∈ N, t ∈ [0, T ]. For all i ∈ I and (s, d) ∈ Di we introduce the following
sets
Ai(s,d) =
{
p ∈ Pi(s,d)
}
,
Bi(s,d) =
{
p ∈ Ai(s,d) : δ
i
(s,d)(t, x
∗(t))− δi(s,d)(t, x
∗k(t)) ≤ 0
}
,
Ci(s,d) =
{
p ∈ Ai(s,d) : 0 < δ
i
(s,d)(t, x
∗(t))− δi(s,d)(t, x
∗k(t)) < xip(t)
}
,
Di(s,d) =
{
p ∈ Ai(s,d) : x
i
p(t) ≤ δ
i
(s,d)(t, x
∗(t))− δi(s,d)(t, x
∗k(t))
}
.
Let us also construct the sequence xik(t), so that
xikp (t) =


xip(t) if p ∈ B
i
(s,d) ∪D
i
(s,d),
xikp (t)−
δi(s,d)(t, x
∗(t))− δi(s,d)(t, x
∗k(t))
|Ci
(s,d)
|
if p ∈ Ci(s,d),
If p ∈ Bi(s,d) ∪ D
i
(s,d), x
ik
p (t) = x
i
p(t) and, since x(t) ∈ K(x
∗), then the
assertion is proved. If p ∈ Ci(s,d), it is easy to show that x
ik
p (t) satisfies the
bound constraints.
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Moreover,∑
p∈Pi
(s,d)
xikp (t) =
∑
p∈Ai
(s,d)
xikp (t) =
∑
p∈Bi
(s,d)
∪Di
(s,d)
xikp (t)
+
∑
p∈Ci
(s,d)
(
xikp (t)−
δi(s,d)(t, x
∗(t))− δi(s,d)(t, x
∗k(t))
|Ci(s,d)|
)
=
∑
p∈Ai
(s,d)
xikp (t)−
(
δi(s,d)(t, x
∗(t))− δi(s,d)(t, x
∗k(t))
)
= δi(s,d)(t, x
∗k(t)).
Therefore, demand requirements are verified and xk(t) ∈ K(x∗k(t)) ∀k ∈ N.
In order to prove that {xk} weakly converges to x, we show that
∀f(t) ∈ L2(0, T ), lim
k→∞
∫ T
0
f(t)(xk(t)− x(t))dt = 0.
Due to the construction of the sequence, we have∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
f(t)(xk(t)− x(t))dt
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
f(t)
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈Ai
(s,d)
(xikp (t)− x
i
p(t))dt
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
f(t)
∑
i∈I
[ ∑
p∈Bi
(s,d)
∪Di
(s,d)
(xikp (t)− x
i
p(t)) +
∑
p∈Ci
(s,d)
(xikp (t)− x
i
p(t))
]
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
f(t)
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈Ci
(s,d)
(
δi(s,d)(t, x
∗(t))− δi(s,d)(t, x
∗k(t))
|Ci(s,d)|
)
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
f(t)
∑
i∈I
(
δi(s,d)(t, x
∗(t))− δi(s,d)(t, x
∗k(t))
)
dt
∣∣∣∣∣.
Now, we observe that δ is continuous with respect to the weak topology.
In fact, on the one hand strong continuity and convexity of δ imply weak
lower semicontinuity; on the other hand assumption f) ensures weak upper
semicontinuity. Therefore, the last expression of the above equality chain
converges to zero and xk weakly converges to x. Moreover, as K(x(t)),
x(t) ∈ E, is a convex, bounded and closed subset of L2(0, T ;Rn+w), it
is weakly compact (see Theorem B.4 in [10]). Finally, assumption f) and
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strong continuity of Ψ and C imply that F is weakly continuous. Thus,
all the assumptions of Theorem 4.1 are fulfilled with respect to the weak
topology and the existence of at least one solution is ensured. 
5 Numerical example
In order to support the theoretical results and illustrate the mixed equilib-
rium features, we consider the following network.
P2
P4
P3
P1
Figure 1: A network model example
We consider the time interval [0, T ] = [0, 1]. The origin-destination pairs
are given by (P1, P4) and (P4, P1). We suppose that O/D pair (P1, P4) is
controlled by a group user (Nash player), whereas O/D pair (P4, P1) is con-
trolled by an individual user (Wardrop player). Therefore, the set of Nash
players N is a singleton and the only element is also denoted by N . Analo-
gously, the set of Wardrop players is a singleton, whose only one element is
denoted by W.
Link flows used by the Nash player are
fN1 (t) = (P1, P2), f
N
2 (t) = (P2, P4),
fN3 (t) = (P2, P3), f
N
4 (t) = (P3, P4),
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and link flows used by the Wardrop player are
fW1 (t) = (P4, P2), f
W
2 (t) = (P2, P1),
fW3 (t) = (P2, P3), f
W
4 (t) = (P3, P1).
Hence, the total link flow is f(t) = (fa(t))
T
a=1,...,7, where
f1(t) = f
N
1 (t), f2(t) = f
N
2 (t), f3(t) = f
N
3 (t) + f
W
3 (t),
f4(t) = f
N
4 (t), f5(t) = f
W
1 (t), f6(t) = f
W
2 (t), f7(t) = f
W
4 (t).
It follows immediately that the Nash player controls the paths
p1 = (P1, P2) ∪ (P2, P4), p2 = (P1, P2) ∪ (P2, P3) ∪ (P3, P4),
whereas the Wardrop player controls the paths
p3 = (P4, P2) ∪ (P2, P1), p4 = (P4, P2) ∪ (P2, P3) ∪ (P3, P1).
The following link cost functions are given (see [9] for the static version of
the model)
c1(f(t)) = 20 + f1(t), c2(f(t)) = 20 + f2(t), c3(f(t)) = 5 + 2f3(t),
c4(f(t)) = 5 + 2f4(t), c5(f(t)) = 20 + f1(t), c6(f(t)) = 20 + f2(t),
c7(f(t)) = 5 + 2f4(t).
We denote by x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), x3(t), x4(t))
T the path flow vector, where
x1(t) = x
N
p1
(t), x2(t) = x
N
p2
(t),
x3(t) = x
W
p3
(t), x4(t) = x
W
p4
(t),
xNpr(t), r = 1, 2, (respectively, x
W
pr
(t), r = 3, 4) is the flow on path pr gen-
erated by users of the set N (respectively W). We now introduce the cost
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functions of users
JN (x(t)) =
2∑
r=1
xNpr(t)
7∑
a=1
γapr
1
µa(t)
ca(f(t)),
CWpr (x(t)) =
7∑
a=1
γapr
1
µa(t)
ca(f(t)), r = 3, 4.
For simplicity we fix µa(t) = 1, ∀a ∈ L a.e. in [0, 1]. Introduced the
notations
Ψ(x(t)) =
( ∂JN (x)
∂xNp1
∂JN (x)
∂xNp2
)
,
C(x(t)) =
(
CWp3 (x(t))
CWp4 (x(t))
)
,
we introduce the vector F
F (x(t)) =
(
Ψ(x(t))
C(x(t))
)
,
whose components are given by
F1(x(t)) = 4x1(t) + 2x2(t) + 40,
F2(x(t)) = 2x1(t) + 10x2(t) + 4x4(t) + 30,
F3(x(t)) = 2x3(t) + x4(t) + 40,
F4(x(t)) = 2x2(t) + x3(t) + 5x4(t) + 30.
The equilibrium flow is a solution to the quasi-variational inequality
Find x∗ ∈ K(x∗) :
∫ 1
0
〈F (x∗(t)), x(t)−x∗(t)〉dt ≥ 0, ∀x(t) ∈ K(x∗), (12)
where
K(x∗(t)) =
{
x(t) ∈ L2(0, 1;R4) : xi(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 4;
x1(t) + x2(t) = δ
N
(P1,P4)
, x3(t) + x4(t) = δ
W
(P4,P1)
a.e. in [0, T ]
}
.
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and
δN(P1,P4)(t, x
∗(t)) = 10t+
2
3
x∗1(t) + 1,
δW(P4,P1)(t, x
∗(t)) = 4t+
1
2
x∗4(t) + 3.
After some calculations we obtain the exact solution(
888
55
t+
21
11
,
254
55
t+
4
11
,
252
55
t+
18
11
,−
64
55
t+
30
11
)
.
It is worth noting that player controlling O/D pair (P1, P4) acts in a system
equilibrium way, but the system is not in a system equilibrium. In fact the
system equilibrium, obtained solving (12) with
F1(x
∗(t)) = 4x∗1(t) + 2x
∗
2(t) + 40,
F2(x
∗(t)) = 2x∗1(t) + 10x
∗
2(t) + 4x
∗
4(t) + 30,
F3(x
∗(t)) = 4x∗3(t) + 2x
∗
4(t) + 40,
F4(x
∗(t)) = 4x∗2(t) + 2x
∗
3(t) + 10x
∗
4(t) + 30,
is given by (
888
55
t+
9
11
,
254
55
t+
8
11
,
252
55
t+
25
11
,−
64
55
t+
16
11
)
.
Under regularity assumptions, solutions are continuous, hence we may nu-
merically solve a sequence of finite-dimensional quasi-variational inequality
problems
〈F (x(tjn)), x − x(t
j
n)〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K(x(t
j
n)),
where a discrete approximation of the time variable is performed by means
of a sequence of partitions πn = 0 = t
0
n < t
1
n < . . . < t
Nn
n = T of the time
interval [0, 1]. We denote by kjn = t
j
n − t
j−1
n the step-size, for j = 1, . . . , Nn
and set kn = maxj k
j .
We omit the statements of the example, solved by applying the extra-
gradient method (see [3, 13, 12, 11] for a discussion on computational pro-
cedures), with Nn = 30, and directly provide numerical results in graphical
form, see Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Curves of equilibria
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The results are, in some sense, paradoxical. In fact, in the examined
situation, player (P1, P4) acts as the player with market power, whereas
player (P4, P1) acts as a price-taker. Therefore one would expect that player
(P1, P4) would have a lower cost than player (P4, P1). Surprisingly, player
(P4, P1) takes advantage from the market power of player (P1, P4) so that
he incurs in a lower cost than player (P1, P4).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we presented time-dependent routing games in telecommunica-
tion networks shared by users with different market power. We studied the
associated mixed equilibria in the framework of the variational inequality
theory. In particular, users are assumed to incur in equilibrium-dependent
travel demands, so that the model, to the best of our knowledge for the first
time, was described by a quasi-variational inequality.
This paper aimed at improving previous literature on this topic, see
[4, 9], taking into consideration the evolution of the system with respect to
time and hence including in the model all the route choices experienced by
users during the whole time interval.
Future extensions of the work include the following issues. First, the
model can be refined by introducing a memory term, which shows how
the current equilibrium situation is affected by the equilibrium distribution
of the previous observation times. Second, the mixed equilibrium can be
approached by duality theory, so that new perspectives and interpretations
of the model can be unveiled.
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